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Foreign debt can be incurred for capital accumulation and
for consumption. It is worth while to borrow for capital
accumulation when the marginal productivity of capital is
greater than the interest rate. And it is worthwhile to
borrow for consumption, if the time preference rate exceeds
the interest rate. If capital can be built instantaneously,
the amount to be borrowed is completely determined by the
condition for the optimal capital stock; a parametric
change of a fixed planning horizon has no impact on the
amount of debt incurred for capital accumulation.
The planning horizon has, however, an impact on the time
profile of consumption and consequently on the time profile
of debt incurred for consumption. It will be shown that if
the rate of time preference exceeds the rate of interest,
then, under some reasonable assumption about the relative
magnitude of the prescribed terminal stock, a lengthening
of the time horizon will lead to a higher consumption
stream in some initial phase, and foreign debt will accumu-
late at a faster rate. In this case, debt incurred will be
repaid in terminal time or not fully be repaid in infinite
time, so that the country remains a debtor and never
reaches a creditor position. We call this the half debt
cycle.
Conversely, if the rate of interest is higher than the rate
of time preference, then the effect of an increase in
the time horizon is a fall in the initial consumption
flow, provided the prescribed terminal stock is not too
large. In addition, a debtor country may turn intoa creditor country for some time interval. This is the case
of a full debt cycle (World Bank 1985,p.47). This holds for
finite time being sufficiently large and for infinite time.
A second switch back to the borrower status is possible.
In a recent paper, Siebert (1987) considered the problem of
foreign borrowing and capital accumulation, and focussed on
the case of a fixed, finite time horizon T, with a zero
terminal capital stock. We generalize Siebert's results in
two directions: firstly, a prescribed terminal capital
stock K is added as a terminal constraint, and secondly we
investigate the effect of lengthening the time horizon.
2. The Model
The economy uses capital, K, and labour, L, to produce an
output
Q = F(K,L).
We assume full employment and a constant population, so
that we can write
Q = F(K). (1)
The function F(K) satisfies the usual properities:
F(0) = 0, FK(K) > 0, FKK(K) < 0.
The stock of capital depreciates at rate m. Let I denote
gross investment. Then
K = I - mK. (2)
The stock of debt is denoted by B. If B is negative, it
denotes a creditor position. Consumption equals gross out-
put, minus gross investment minus interest payments plus
additional borrowing:C = Q - I - rB + B. (3)
Rearrange (3), making use of (1), to obtain
B = C + I.+ rB-F(K). (4)
The initial stock of debt is zero and the initial stock of
capital is Ko which is historically given. We allow instan-
taneous accumulation (or "jump" in K) financed by bor-
rowing. This is possible because we place no bound on gross
investment. The initial jump in capital from Ko to say
K(0
+) is paid for by an equal jump in debt from 0 to B(0
+).
We allow B(0+) to exceed K(0
+) - Ko, so as to allow a jump
in debt to finance borrowing for consumption. (However, it
will be shown that B(0
+) = K(0
+) - Ko, because it is not
optimal to finance additional consumption by a sudden jump
in B). At this stage, for the sake of generality, we write
B(0 +) > K(0
+) - Ko.
Note that K(0+) is to be determined optimally.
At the terminal time T, the stock of net wealth is K(T) -
B(T). We require that terminal net wealth must be equal
or exceed some specified level K
 x > .
K(T) - B(T) > K.
The planning authority wishes to maximize the present value






subject to (2), (4) and
i) K(0*), B(0
+) to be chosen, subject to the constraint
B(0
+)"Kf0*)-Ko (5)
ii) K(T) and R(T) to be determined, subject to
K(T) - R(T) > K (6)
Ko, K and T are exogenous!y specified.
The Lagrangean for this problem is
7, - W(C) + X [I - mKj -f p[C + T - F(K)
 J rR] (7)
The optimality conditions are
|| ~- 0 ^ We ••• - P (7n)
(7b)
A = 8A-- l
?; r> A = x .8 + ID) + p FK (K) (7C)
9Z
3B
8 p - -,; --•> p r. p (g - r) (7d)
Define the J function as in Long and Vousden (1977) in
otder to obtain the transversal ity conditions:
,T : (..: (B(0*) - K'O*) + Ko ' + n.:. (K(T) -- B(T) - K) (H)then






























Hi > 0, Mi[B(0*) - K(O
+) + Ko] - 0 (8e)
M2 ^ 0 , |i2[K(T)-B(T)-K]--0 (8f)
Combining (7a), (7b) and (8a) - (8f), we have
X(T) - -p(T) = We (C(T)) > 0 (9a)
A ( 0) = - p (0 > = We (C ( 0 ) )
 x' 0 ( 9b )
Therefore at the optimum
B(0
+) = K(0
+) - Ko (10a)
K(T) - B(T) = K (10b)
From (7b), (7c^ and {Id), we obtain
FK(K) - m = r (11)Therefore K*(t) is a constant. It is the stock size at
which the net marginal product of capital equals the rate
of interest. It follows that
K(0
+) = K* = K(T) (12)
If Ko < K*, conditions (10a) and (12) imply that the coun-
try immediately raises its capital stock to K* by borrowing
the amount B(0
+) = K* - Ko.
If K < K*, then from (10b) and (12) we know that
B(T) = K* - K > 0
We may interpret B(T
+) = 0 and K(T
+) = K as implying
that the economy repays its debt at the end of the
planning horizon, by affecting a downward jump in its
capital stock, from K(T') = K* to K(T
+) = K.
3 . T h e C o n s um p t i o n P a t h
We are now in a position to determine the consumption path:
From (7a) and (7d)
"-
c-
c-°- -°- - -P / P = -(8 - r)
We C
Defining the elasticity of marginal utilityn = - > 0,
We
then C/C = -(8 - r)/n (13)
So C increases exponentially if r exceeds 8 and decreases
exponentially if r < 8.
To proceed further, we assume that n is a constant. In
other words, the function W(C) is assumed to take the formW(C) - A , n
 v 0, n / 1, A ~ constant
W(C)




If n - 1, then W(C) = lnC +.A. Since n is a constant,
(13) yields
C(t) " CfO]p ' r- « > t / (0 < t < T) (14)
In order to emphasize the fact that both C(0) and C(t)
depend on the time horizon T, we write (14) as
C(t, T) = C(0, T) e 'r-« > t/ n (0 < t < T) (15)
To solve for CfO, T), we use the equation
B - rB -• C - Q,
where Q - F(K*) - mK* is net output.





t (B - rB) - e '
r
t (C(t, T) - Q)
(17)
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D = r -
r - 8 (18)
We assume P •}• 0. Therefore, '17a) becomes
e -
r
T B(T) - B(0
+)
I 1 - e -" ] ~ f"
- cro.T) ; --------- { - Q |
e - - r T
(19)
Now since B(0*) = K* - Ko





 T- e ~
r
 T
Q - r K* + Ko - e -'T K (20)
The left-hand side of (20) is the present value of the con-
sumption stream. Note that the term [1 - e ~
DT]/D is posi-
tive for all D / 0, because if D < 0, then e ~
D
T > 1, and
if D > 0 then e "
D
T < 1. Equation (20) implies that for
consumption to be positive, the prescribed terminal net
wealth K must not be too large.
We now offer an intuitive interpretation of equation
(20). Assume for the moment that Ko = K = 0. Then the
left-hand side of (20) is the present value of the stream
of wage income [Q - rK* is the net output minus the
payment to capital, which goes to foreigners to service
debts, so Q - rK* represents wage income]. Hence (20) says
that the present value of the consumption stream (the
left-hand-side of (20)) must be equal to the present
value of wage income, if Ko = K = 0. If Ko > 0 and K = 0,
then the country can afford to consume more than its
present value of wage income. If K > 0, the country has
to consume less, because of its commitment to the bequest
of K.
3 .1 C o m p a r a t i v e S t a t i c s
Our result concerning the effect of an increase in T as the
consumption profile is:
Proposition 1: If 6 > r, then a lengthening of the time
horizon will raise the consumption flow provided that
e "
r
T K > Ko.10
Proof: Rewrite (20) as
C(0,T) - (Ko - e -'-
T K) D (1 - e -DT)-I
+ (0 - rK*) (D/r) (1 - e - &T)-I (] - e . - r T ) (21)
Differentiate (21) with respect to T:
(22)
'•Ji' |_ r (1 - e " D
 T )
We only need to show that -
9~i°il2 > 0.
3T
The second term on the right-hand side of (22) is positive,
if and only if 8 > r (see Appendix 1). The first term
is positive if Ko < e ~
r
T K. Recall that D (1 - e "
DT) is
always positive for D / 0.
EndofProof
3.2 1111 e r p r e t a t i o n
To give an intuitive explanation of Proposition 1, let us
first consider the simple case, where Ko = 0 = K. Then
equation (20) sayr, that the present, value of the consump-
tion stream must equal the present value of the stream of
wage income. Since consumption falls over time (due to 8 >
r* , it follows that consumption exceeds wage income for
some initial phase, and falls short of wage income for the






The present value of area B must equal the present value of
area A. Now let the time horizon increase from T to (T +
AT). We want to show that C(0, T + A T) is higher than
C(0,T). The longer time horizon means that the present
value of wage income stream (now extending from 0 to
T + AT) will be higher, hence the country can afford to
consume more. Therefore C(0,T + A T) > C(0,T). Since both
paths follow the exponential rule, C(t,T + A) > C(t,T)
for all t < T. However, one can show that C(T + A T, T +
AT) is smaller than C(T,T).
If K - 0 and Ko > 0, then a lengthening of T may not
raise the consumption flow, because the initial wealth,
Ko , has to be "used up" over a longer horizon. More
generally, we interpret e~
r
T K - Ko as the present value of
net: addition to wealth, to be given to future generations.
A longer time horizon makes it possible to achieve this
target less painfully.12
Turning now to the case 8 < r, we have the corresponding
result:
P r o p o s i t i on 2:
If 8 < r, then a lengthening of the time horizon will




sufficiently small relative to Ko.
The proof follows the same line of arguments used in the











We now turn our attention to the time path of debt, and the
effect of an increase in T of this path.
Consider first the case 8 > r. Given that the country has
the target K to meet at time T, and that the present value
of this target is e~
r
T K, it is clear that if this present
value is not too large, then the country will want to bor-
row for consumption in some early periods, and that if
e-rT j( js large, then the country may have to tighten its
belt to meet the target, so that even though borrowing is
in a sense attractive (6 > r), the country cannot afford to
do so. An increase in T, by postponing the date of meeting
the target, would have a favourable effect on consumption,
and allow debt to grow initially.
In order to verify the above intuitive arguments, we derive
below the explicit time path of B(t) and examine its sensi-
tivity with respect to the planning horizon.
For any fixed T, the time path of debt can be calculated
using (17). Take the indefinite integral of (17):
C(0 T) e> ~
D
t Q f ~
r
t
Be -rr = _ 2i»il2_5 + =-5--— + H (23)
where H is a constant of integration.
Multiply both sides by e
 r
t





Hence H s B(0M - .9- + 512.12 r D
(26)
Using (26) in (24) we obtain
B(t,T) = .<„., - 9 r t
(27)
But we have proved that B(0+) = K* - Ko. Hence
B(t,T (K* _ Ko) _ _?_ + -i^iii e rt
Q
< r - 8 ) t
(28)
We are now ready to prove the following result:
Proposition 3: If 8 > r, then B > 0 for some initial phase,
provided e~
r




(r - 8) t
r - (29)
At t = 0,
dB
"dt"





- Q +r(K* - Ko) (30b)
= C(0,T) - Q + r(K* - Ko) (30c)
Substitute (21) into (30c) and rearrange terms
dB
"dt (Q - rK*)
t = 0





T - r T (31)
Now, since 8 > r, we have D > r, and
D (1 - e -rT)
r (1 - e "
D
T )
> 1, i.e. _ e TT
>
r
- e - DT
(32)
In order to prove (32), one only needs to show that
(1 - e ~
yT)/y is a decreasing function of y. We leave this
task to the reader. It suffices to note that the proof
would be similar to the proof that (e
 y
T - l)/y is an
increasing function of y, and the latter proof is in16
Appendix 1. Also, since D > r > 0, > D > r. So
if e ~
r
T K is not too large, the right-hand-side of (31)
will be posit ive.
(End of Proof)
The result is illustrated in Figure 4, for a given K. The
longer the time horizon, the smaller is e ~
r
T K, and the
larger is B(0). In particular, if B(0) is positive and Ko
is smaller then K (as illustrated), then B must be negative
eventually, and given T, there exists a unique t'( which
depends on T) at which B = 0, this t' can be solved expli-






T, T2 T3 T4
Figure 4 (K > Ko, 8 > r)
t ime17
We note that when the stock of debt falls (B < 0) , it falls
at an increasing rate (B = rB + C < 0, since C < 0 for
8 > r). From this remark, it follows that in the case
8 > r, debt never increases after a period of decline: this
would violate the concavity of B(t) when B < 0. Another way
of seeing this is to note that if B(0) < 0, then from (30a)
. Io




For t > 0, the first term in (29) will be given weight
r
t
> 1 while the second term will be given weight
e t < 1, making B more negative still. Thus we have
n
proved the following:
Proposition 4: If 8 > r and K < K*, the country will not
change its status from borrower to lender. This is the case
of a half debt cycle.
For the opposite case where r > 8, we have a richer story:
it is possible that the optimal strategy involves switching
of status twice (from borrower to lender and then back to
borrower again).
Consider the simplest case with r > 8, K = Ko = 0.






"r (1 - e -*
T)
- 1 < 0 (33)18
The negative sign follows from the fact that the sign of
(32) is reversed when r < 8; note that r < 5 if and only if
r < D.
Since B(0*) = K* - Ko = K*, and B(T) = K(T) - K = K(T)= K*,
it follows that the time path of debt is U - shaped. This
is illustrated in Figure 5. At time tA, the country swit-
ches its status from a borrower to a lender. This switch is
reversed at time tB. This second switch hinges on the
possibility to use part of the terminal capital stock to
repay debt.
time
Figure 5 (r > 8, K = Ko = 0)
Clearly if Ko and K are positive but not too large, then
the same story applies. Note also that the function B(t) is
convex when B > 0, because B = rB + C > 0.
There are exceptions to the U - shaped case. For example,
consider the case where D < r but T is sufficiently short
so that
> r. Then, from (31), B(0) > 0 provided K is
1 - e "
D
T
small. In this case, even though 8 < r, the country borrows
for consumption and for capital accumulation. This is19
because it wants to maintain its capital stock at the effi-
cient level K* for all t, until time T, when the stock of









Figure 6 (r > 8)




: If r > 8, and both Ko and K are sufficiently
small, the country may at first borrow, then gradually
switch to the lender status and finally accumulate debt
again. However, if Ko is sufficiently large and the time
horizon is very short, then the country may borrow both for
consumption and capital accumulation, and debt increases
over time.20
Finally we note that the effect of an increase in the time
horizon on the time path of debt has the same sign as its
effect on the initial consumption. An increase in terminal
time T reduces the level of initial debt. This is stated
more precisely in the following proposition.
ition 6:
3 B(t,T) _ 3 C(0,T)
—;----- - SIGN —fj-~~
Proof: Differentiate (28) with respect to T:
3B(t,T) _ 1
8T D
r - S )t 3 C(0,T) ________
The sign of the term inside the brackets [...] is exactly
the same as the sign of r - ( ), which is D. But this
n
term is multiplied by "-• This completes the proof.
5. The Case of Infinite Horizon
When the time horizon is infinite, there are no convincing
reasons why one should impose conditions such as
lim B(t) < 0,
t "^ 00
or
lim [B(t) - K(t)] < 0
"E "^ 00
It is more natural to specify that, in the limit, interest
on the stock of debt must not exceed net national product:
lim [rB(t)] < lim [F(K(t)) - mK(t)] (35) t-»oo t-»o>21
This constraint ensures that the country will not keep on
increasing its indebtness without bounds.
Notice that if D < 0 (i.e. 8 < r(l -n)) then the integral
(17b) does not converge when T -• CD . This means that for
infinite horizon we have to restrict our attention to the
case D > 0.
Since the right-hand-side of (35) is finite, it is clear
that if debt is positive, then
lim e "
r
T B(T) = 0, (36)
and (18) gives
C(0,«) = [(Q - rK*) .+ rKo] (D/r) . (37)
Substituting this into (28), we see that if r - 8 < 0 then
in the limit, the stock of debt converges to Q/r, the
capital value of net national output. The present value of
the steady-state stream of wage income consumption however
declines to zero asymtotially. Thus, in the half debt-cycle
the country remains a debtor for eternity.
r - 8
If r - 8 > 0 and D > 0, then ( ) < r, and in this
n
case (31) holds, but the stock of debt tends to minus
infinity (the country is the lender in the long run and the
country has gone through the full debt cycle), while its
discounted value, e ~
r
t B(t) converges to zero. In other
words, the country's financial assets grow without bounds,
but at a rate smaller than the interest rate. Consumption
grows without bounds, at the rate (r - 6) / r\ < r.
6 . C o n c 1 u s i o n s
When capital can be accumulated instantaneously, external
borrowing for capital accumulation will occur initially.
The amount of debt is specified by the difference between
the optimal capital stock and the initially given stock22
with the optimal stock being determined by the equality of
the marginal productivity of capital and the interest rate.
The amount of debt is independent of the time horizon.
Debt incurred for consumption, however, varies with the
time horizon. It is worth while to borrow for consumption
if the time preference rate exceeds the interest rate. In
that case, the country never has an incentive to lend
money; it therefore always remains a borrower, and we only
have a half debt cycle. In the case of the half cycle,
lengthening the time horizon will lead to a higher
consumption stream in some initial phase; debt will
accumulate at a faster rate. Thus, institutional arrange-
ments that allow a longer time horizon like the esta-
blishment of efficient capital markets, will improve the
present value of welfare for capital-poor countries. If the
planning horizon approaches infinity and if interest on
debt is limited by net national output, the stock of debt
remains positive. It is limited by the capital value of net
national output.
If, however, the time preference rate is lower than the
interest rate, it is not worth while to borrow for
consumption. Then, a lengthening of the time horizon will
lower the consumption flow if the present value of the
terminal capital stock to be handed over to future
generations in terminal time is sufficiently small relative
to the initial capital stock. A lengthening of the time
horizon will also reduce debt in the initial periods. With
the interest rate being greater than the time preference
rate, the country may at first borrow and then change its
status to a lender. Thus, the country may complete a full
debt cycle (and it may eventually switch to a borrower
again). This holds if both the initial and the terminal
capital stock are sufficiently small. If the initial23
capital stock is sufficiently large relative to the
terminal capital stock, debt increases over time.
We have made a number of simplifying assumptions, which
must be relaxed in future studies. For example one may
introduce adjustment costs which prevent instantaneous
accumulation. Another step toward more realism would be to
make the rate of interest dependent on the size of the
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T (1 - e ~
DT) e "
DT(1 - e "
rT)
r
-rT (J _ e -DT)
r ^e -rxj \l - e -or
- e [De
1 -
- (e 'T - 1) r
- (e or - 1)
We now show that
I (e „ .
I (e
< 1 if and only if D > r.
(Note: D > r if and only if 8 > r).25
Proof, that
--- (e " - 1)
s J. II u ? r.
... (e -_ !)
Define f(y) = (e *
T -1). We need to show that f(y) is
an increasing function of y. Now
y T e *




So we must show 1 - e *
T + yT e *
T > 0 for all yT j 0
i.e. show 1 - e
2 + ze
 2 > 0 for all z ^ 0
Now e
 z is a convex function. Let g(z) = e
 z. Then, from
the properties of convex function, for all z* ^ z,





Let z* ^ b; Then
1 - e
2 > -z e
2
1 - e




* We appreciate comments from G. Franke and M. Rauscher.
1) In Siebert's model, K = 0, so that K(T) > B(T); it is
also possible to require B(T
+) = 0, so that there is a
downward jump in both K and B: the capital stock is used
to repay debt .
2) D may be positive or negative. D > r if and only if
6 > r. D is negative, if and only if r(l-n) - 8 > 0. It
can be shown that if D is negative then the infinite
horizon problem has no optimal solution; see Arrow and
Kurz (1970), p. 156, on this last point. The expression
[
L J is always positive,
regardless of the sign of D, because if D < 0 then
e ~
D
t > 1 for all t > 0 , and if D > 0 then e "
D
t < 1,
for all t > 0. By the same reason , D(l - e -«>t) is
always positive.27
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